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John Arthur Scott, a member of the narcotics unit of the Muskegon, Michigan police force, was indicted on three counts of distributBefore his trial in the United
ing various controlled substances.'
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss two counts of the indictment 2 on
the ground of preindictment delay. 3 The motion, which was denied
without prejudice, 4 was renewed at the close of the government's
case 5 and again denied without prejudice. 6 After the defense had
I

United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84 (1978). The three counts of the March 5, 1975

indictment related to three separate occurrences. Count I was based on an alleged distribution
of cocaine on September 20, 1974. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for United States]. The second count charged respondent with the distribution of codeine on September 24, 1974. Id. An alleged distribution of
heroin on January 22, 1975 formed the basis of Count III. Id. The three transactions were
alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970), which makes it unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, a controlled substance.
2 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). Respondent's motion to dismiss was presented pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[any defense, objection, or request which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion." FED. R. CaiM. P. 12(b).
' United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). Respondent contended that the delay between the alleged commission of the offenses charged in Counts I and II and his indictment for those offenses violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 3-4, which provides in
relevant part that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the due process analysis to be
applied to motions to dismiss on the grounds of preindictment delay, see notes 145-55 infra and
accompanying text.
4 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). The district court's decision to deny respondent's motion to dismiss came after a
pretrial hearing on the motion. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 4. The trial judge
determined that the respondent had not sufficiently shown that the delay by the government
was intentional, nor that it had prejudiced his defense. Brief for the Respondent at 23-24,
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent]. The trial
judge apparently needed to hear more evidence on the question of whether the resultant prejudice to respondent's defense warranted dismissal, indicating that it would be reconsidered
upon renewal after the presentation of evidence. Id. at 23 & n.ll.
5 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). The government presented evidence attempting to prove that respondent, a narcotics
officer, "had gone into the drug business for himself" and had, on the dates charged in the
indictment, distributed drugs to a government informant. Brief for United States, supra note 1,
at 4.
6 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and reanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). The court also denied respondent's motion for a judgment of acquittal, deciding
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presented its case and all the evidence had been received, 7 the motion to dismiss was renewed and subsequently granted on the basis of
preindictment delay. 8 The court submitted the third count to the
jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty. 9
The government sought to appeal the dismissal of the two counts
of the indictment to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 10 In
a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction," concluding that further prosecution of the respondent was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. 12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the appealability of the dismissal of the first count.1 3 In
United States v. Scott, 1 4 a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that reprosecution of
instead to continue the jury trial. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 4.
7 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). Respondent's defense was that he had been "'set up"' by the informant, who was
himself a drug trafficker. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 5.
8 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). The district court concluded that respondent's inability to recall the events of September 20, 1974 "had 'presented sufficient proof of prejudice with respect to count I.' 437
U.S. 82, 84 (1978). In granting the motion to dismiss for preindictment delay after the evidence
had been presented, the judge ruled that respondent had sustained his burden of showing
intentional delay and resulting prejudice. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 24.
9 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978).
10 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S. 82
(1978). Recognizing that the acquittal by the jury on the third count clearly barred reprosecution, the government did not seek appeal on Count III. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at
6 n.5.
H United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S. 82
(1978). Jurisdiction for government appeals of criminal cases is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976), which in its 1971 amended form provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals.
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
Id. The court of appeals found the government's appeal in this case to lie "squarely within" the
double jeopardy prohibition. 544 F.2d at 903. For a discussion of the historical development of
the government's statutory right of appeal in criminal cases, see notes 27-36 infra and accompanying text.
12 United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 437 U.S.
82 (1978). Among its fundamental protections, the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
13 434 U.S. 889 (1977). The government indicated that their reason for not appealing the
dismissal of Count II was the absence of any discernible reason for the district court's decision,
'rather than a concession of its finality. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 5-6 n.4.
14 437 U.S. 82 (1978).

NOTES

1978]

the respondent was not barred by double jeopardy principles. 15 The
Coui't, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, overruled United States v.
Jenkins 16 and held that the government may appeal from a defendant's successful effort to terminate his trial "without any submission
to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence." 17 Recognizing
the fundamental double jeopardy principle that verdicts of acquittal
are final and may not be reprosecuted,18 the Scott majority concluded
that there was no true acquittal where the termination of the proceedings against the defendant was not based upon his factual innocence. 19 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by three
other Justices, argued that the rule announced in Jenkins "is vital to
the implementation of the values protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause," and should not be overruled. 2 0 Instead of restricting the
ranks of unappealable trial court judgments to actual determinations
dissent would have affirmed the judgment of
of factual innocence, 2the
1
the court of appeals.
Consideration of the government's right of appeal in criminal
cases requires a searching inquiry into double jeopardy principles extending well beyond the language of the clause itself.2 2 While the
precise origin of the principle of double jeopardy is unclear, it is rec23
ognized as "one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization."

15 Id.

at 84.

16 420 U.S. 358 (1975). In Jenkins, the Supreme Court, also in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, had held that regardless of whether a dismissal of an indictment amounted to an
acquittal on the merits, where "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of
factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon
reversal and remand," government appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at
369-70.
17 437 U.S. at 101.
18 Id. at 91; see notes 37-41 infra and accompanying text.
19 437 U.S. at 97-98.
20 Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White, Marshall and Stevens joined in the
dissent, finding the majority's "attempt to draw a distinction between 'true acquittals' and other
unsupportable in either logic or
final judgments favorable to the accused, quite simply, ...
policy." Id.
21 Id. at 115-16.
22 In recognizing the need for this inquiry in double jeopardy questions, it has been stated
that "we must look not merely to the familiar but unilluminating words of the Double Jeopardy
clause, 'nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,' but also to its historical background, the proceedings leading to its adoption as part of
the Fifth Amendment, and the course of decisions thereunder." United States v. Jenkins, 490
F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 339 (1975); Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in
Criminal Cases, 80 DicsK. L. REv. 525, 530 (1976).
23 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). In a revelatory and
thoroughly documented synopsis of the historical background of the double jeopardy doctrine,
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Modern historical analysis of the doctrine usually begins with
Blackstone, who described it as a "universal maxim of the comynon
law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offense." 24 Blackstone's "universal
maxim" was imported into the United States Constitution by the drafters of the Bill of Rights, 25 and has since become firmly embedded as
26
a fundamental protection.
It is a settled principle of modern American jurisprudence that
there is no government right of appeal in criminal cases in the absence of express statutory authority. 2 7 No such statutory authority
existed prior to 1907, when Congress enacted the original Criminal
Appeals Act, 2 8 allowing the government a limited right to appeal cerJustice Black traced its roots to the Greeks and Romans, who forbade reprosecution after an
acquittal. Id. at 151-52 & n.3; Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Crimina! Dismissals, 52 TEx. L. REv. 303, 305 n.7 (1974). See also J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
2-3 (1969).
24 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND J35 (Jones ed. 1916). The

three common law pleas of autrefois acquit (former acquittal), autrefois convict (former conviction) and pardon were based on the same principle, id.at *335-36, and "prevented the retrial
of a person who had previously been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the same offense."
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 87. For further discussion of the English common law
origins of double jeopardy, see J. SIGLER, supra note 23, at 16-21; Kirk, 'Jeopardy" During the
Period of the Year Books, 32 U. PA. L. REv. 602 (1934); Comment, supra note 23, at 305-07.
25 United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
While the absence of any meaningful reported debate on the clause precludes definitive analysis
of intent, Congress' choice of the "twice in jeopardy" language "strongly suggests" that the
intention was to provide the same protection that had developed at common law. 490 F.2d at
873; J. SIGLER, supra note 23, at 32.
26 In applying the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969),
recognized it as "clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice."' Id. at 796. In what
has become the classic statement of the interests at the heart of the double jeopardy clause,
Justice Black stated in Green v. United States:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). "[Slociety's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant," United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971), is reflected in the policy of the Bill of Rights which would, "make rare indeed the
occasions when the citizen can for the same offense be required to run the gantlet twice." Gori
v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 373 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For further discussion of
the public policy interests opposing reprosecution, see Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 449, 497-506 (1977); Note, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal
Cases, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1822, 1837-38 (1974); Co.mment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J.
262, 278-79 (1965).
27 United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892).
28 34 Stat. 1246 (1907); see United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 292-96 (1970).
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tain judgments. 2 9 The language of the statute, however, being
couched in antiquated common law pleadings, posed difficulties in
interpretation. 3 0 Despite several minor changes in the language of
the Act over the years, 3 1 courts continued to struggle with the statutory restrictions upon appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. 32 Judicial frustration culminated in 1970, when the Supreme Court in
United States v. Sisson 33 assailed the Act as "a most unruly child that
29 The Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 gave the government the right to appeal from three
particular common law judgments and vested appellate jurisdiction exclusively in the Supreme
Court, providing in pertinent part:
[A] writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the
district or circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all
criminal cases, in the following instances, to wit:
From a decision or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer
to, any indictment, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based
upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is
founded.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment is founded.
From the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
34 Stat. 1246 (1907), quoted in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 292 n.21; 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.03[4], at 86 n.6 (2d ed. 1975).
31 Judicial attempts to settle upon a general approach to the interpretation of the common
law terms "arrest of judgment" and "special plea in bar" proved troublesome, and sixty years
later there was still no settled approach to these provisions. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S.
267, 300 & n. 53-54 (i970); Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12
COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 295, 297 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Double Jeopardy].
31 The Criminal Appeals Act was amended in 1942, giving the courts of appeal jursidiction
over government appeals. 56 Stat. 271 (1942), cited in 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 29,
110.03[4], at 88-89. The 1942 amendment also slightly modified the common law
language by permitting a government appeal upon the dismissal of an indictment for deficiencies in pleading not involving the invalidity or construction of the underlying statute. Id.
In 1948, the amended provisions of the act were codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1948)
(amended 1971), which, in essence, reflected only minor changes in the original language of the
act. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra at
110.03[41, at 88-89; Comment, Government
Appeals of PretrialDismissals-The Implications of Double Jeopardy, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 942,
945 & n.26 (1975). One purpose of these modifications was to conform to Rule 12(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which had abolished pleas in abatement and special pleas
in bar, substituting a "motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief" as provided in the rules.
FED. R. CriM. P. 12(a); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra at
110.0412], at 99-100.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1959). The court of
appeals in Apex interpreted the act as allowing government appeal from a "decision or judgment
'setting aside, or dismissing' an indictment only if such decision or judgment is based upon a
defect in the indictment or in the institution of the prosecution." Id. at 755. Recognizing the
strictness with which the statutory provisions were construed against government appeals, the
Apex court invited Congress to enact remedial legislation if it wished to enlarge the government's right of appeal.,Id. at 759.
33 399 U.S. 267 (1970). In Sisson, the district court had granted defendant's motion for what
it termed an "arrest of judgment," after a jury verdict of guilty. United States v. Sisson, 297 F.
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has not improved with age." 34 Prompted at least in part by this
judicial disapprobation, Congress enacted the current statutory provisions controlling government appeals in criminal cases.3 5 The effect
of the 1971 amendment was to eliminate the antiquated and artificial
statutory restrictions upon appealability, and to focus the relevant inquiry upon the constitutional principles underlying the double
jeopardy clause. 3 6
It is "[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence" that a verdict of acquittal in a criminal

Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). The court was convinced by
the evidence adduced at trial that Sisson, who was charged with draft evasion, was a "sincerely
conscientious man" to whom the Selective Service Act should not be applied. 297 F. Supp. at
908, 910; Double Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 298. The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion
by Justice Harlan, held that the district court's ruling was not properly termed an "arrest of
judgement," but rather having been based upon factual conclusions adduced at trial, the decision was actually an acquittal. 399 U.S. at 288. In its conclusion that the trial court's label of its
decision is not controlling as to the question of appealability, Sisson stands for the principle that
reviewing courts must look beyond the label used by the trial court in determining the true
nature of the decision and its effect on reprosecution. Id. at 279 n.7.
34 399 U.S. at 307. The Court explained:
Clarity is to be desired in any statute, but in matters of jurisdiction it is especially
important. Otherwise the courts and the parties must expend great energy, not on
the merits of dispute settlement, but on simply deciding whether a court has the
power to hear a case. When judged in these terms, the Criminal Appeals Act is a
failure.
. . . Nevertheless, until such time as Congress decides to amend the statute,
this Court must abide by the limitations imposed by this awkward and ancient Act.
Id. at 307-08.
35 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976); see note 11 supra. As originally proposed, the bill would have
allowed the government to appeal any decision or order terminating a prosecution, "except that
no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal." 116 CONG. REc. 35658 (1970). The conference
committee redrafted the provision to read as it now does. [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5848-49. It has been noted that:
While no reason is given for the change, it would appear that the Senate's [original]
draft would have permitted appeals in cases where the double jeopardy clause
would have prohibited them because double jeopardy often prohibits reprosecution
after a trial begins and is terminated even though the defendant was not acquitted.
United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 n.6 (3d Cir. 1973); see Comment, supra note
31, at 946.
36 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975). In Wilson, Justice Marshall noted that "[wihile the language
of the new Act is not dispositive, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended to
remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." Id. at 337. It therefore becomes "necessary to take a closer look at the
policies underiying the Clause in order to determine more precisely the boundaries of the
Government's appeal rights in criminal cases." Id. at 339; United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. at 568; see Comment, supra note 22, at 528 & n.30; Comment, supra note 31, at
946.
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trial is final and establishes a bar to reprosecution for the same of38
fense. 3 7 The principle originally expressed in United States v. Ball
and recognized as "the settled law of this court" in Kepner v. United
States 39 protects a defendant, found not guilty for an offense at trial,
from a second trial for that offense. 4 0 Based upon the common law
plea of autrefois acquit, this fundamental rule reflects the basic notion that " 'no one should be twice vexed for one and the same
cause.' "41 In applying this doctrine, the Court has often emphasized that an "acquittal" is not defined by its label but by its legal
effect. 4 2 By itself the term has no talismanic effect for double
jeopardy purposes, but must be viewed in its procedural context to
determine if appeal by the government would4 3 be violative of the
policies underlying the double jeopardy clause.
Another fundamental principle of double jeopardy law is that the
criminal defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal." 4 4 This right, however, is by no means absolute, and at times must be "subordinated to the public's interest in
fair trials designed to end in just judgments." 45 Recognizing that a

37 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
38 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In Ball, the jury had found the defendant not guilty of murder. On
appeal, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating
the Constitution." Id. at 671.
39 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904). Kepner, in relying squarely on the principle enunciated in Ball,
recognized that the protection is not against the risk of being twice punished, but against a
second trial for the same offense. Id. at 130. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes espoused a
"continuing jeopardy" theory, namely "that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be
more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried," and that one
jeopardy continues throughout one case. Id. at 134. This theory, however, has never found
support in the Court. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 197 (1957).
40 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962). In a per curiam opinion, the Court
held that since the trial in the district court had terminated with an acquittal, the double
jeopardy clause barred reprosecution. Id. This is so even where "the acquittal was based upon
an egregiously erroneous foundation." Id.
41 Comment, supra note 26, at 265 n.ll; see note 24 supra and accompanying text.
42 United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 279 n.7 (1970); see United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
43 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975); Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 454-55;
Comment, supra note 22, at 538-39.
44 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). The Court in Crist v. Bretz stated that
"[riegardless of its historic origin, . . . the defendant's 'valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal' is now within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy." 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978); see Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 34 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (describing this valued right as "cardinal principle of double jeopardy
law").
45 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
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criminal trial is an inherently complex affair to manage, the Court
allows the prosecution a full and reasonable opportunity to obtain a
conviction. 46 The need for this flexible approach is evident in cases
in which the first trial must be terminated prior to final judgment by
47
a judicial declaration of mistrial.
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Perez 48 is the starting point for analysis of the constitutionality of
reprosecution following mistrial. 49 In Perez, a mistrial was declared,
without the defendant's consent, when the jury was unable to agree
on a verdict. 50 The Court held that the trial judge's declaration of a
mistrial posed no bar to reprosecution when there was a "manifest
necessity" for declaring the mistrial, constrained by "the ends of public justice." 51

While Perez emphasized that mistrials should be granted only
"with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances," 5 2 the Court
has not always closely scrutinized the trial judge's decision. 53 In
Gori v. United States, 54 the Court refused to bar retrial, declining to
substitute its own judgment for the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in hastily declaring a mistrial. 5 5 Less than two years later,
6 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 & n. 16 (1978); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479-80 (1971); Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 494; Note, Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15
AM. CriM. L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1977).
47 It is generally recognized that when the trial judge terminates the proceedings by declaring a mistrial, he is contemplating reprosecution of the defendant after whatever necessary
remedial actions are taken. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7 (1971); Schulhofer,
supra note 26, at 458.
48 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
49 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689-90 (1949).
50 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579.
51 Id. at 580; see Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 689-90 (1949). But see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 490-91. Professor Schulhofer
suggests that the traditional "'manifest necessity" standard "provides no guidance for understanding mistrial decisions" in double jeopardy jurisprudence. Id.; see Comment, Double Jeopardy
and Reprosecution After Mistrial Is the Manifest Necessity Text Manifestly Necessary?, 69
Nw. U. L. REv. 887 (1975).
52 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. This scrutiny is necessary because in certain circumstances a
declaration of mistrial invokes the constitutional protections of the double jeopardy clause. Underlying double jeopardy principles protecting a defendant from government harassment and
the anxiety and expense of multiple trials require that he not be harassed by successive aborted
criminal proceedings. Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1272, 1274 (1964); see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 463.
53 See Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 459-62.
- 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
55 Id. at 367-69. The presiding judge believed that the prosecutor was about to engage in a
line of questioning calculated to bring out evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant. Id. at 366 & n.7. The "'premature" mistrial declaration came from the bench sua sponte
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Downum v. United States 56 resolved all doubts in these cases "in
favor of the liberty of the citizen," indicating that the Court was willing to undertake a more searching review of judicial discretion. s7 In
United States v. Jorn,5 8 the Court effectively reaffirmed Downum,
holding that where there was no "manifest necessity" for the trial
court's declaration of a mistrial, reprosecution was barred by double
jeopardy principles.5 9 Declining to adhere to the Gori analysis of
whether the mistrial was intended to benefit the defendant, 60 the
Court recognized that the harm to the defendant inherent in reprosecution after a mistrial is the same "regardless of the motivation underlying the trial judge's action."61 The straightforward approach
which Jorn returned to the "manifest necessity" test did not long survive. 6 2 In Illinois v. Somerville, 6 3 the Court employed what it
termed a general balancing approach, premised upon the "'ends of
public justice,"'64 emphasizing the preservation of the government's
opportunity to convict. 6 5 While Somerville did not expressly overbefore the prosecutor had asked any improper question, and before the defense had raised any
objection. Id. at 365-66. In writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated that a mistrial
granted "in the sole interest of the defendant," even without his consent, does not bar retrial
under double jeopardy principles. Id. at 369.
56 372 U.S. 734 (1963). A shift in Court personnel, with Justice Goldberg replacing Justice
Frankfurter in 1963, enabled Justice Douglas and the Gori dissenters to enunciate their double
jeopardy views as the majority in Downum. Schulhofer, supra note 66, at 463 n.62; Note, supra
note 46, at 176 n.55.
57 372 U.S. at 738; see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 463-64. The Court criticized the Gori
approach of paying deference to "'arbitrary judicial discretion"' for failing to closely scrutinize
the propriety of mistrials declared by the trial court. 372 U.S. at 738.
58 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
59 Id. at 486-87. The Court utilized a flexible approach to the question of the "manifest
necessity" of a mistrial declared without the defendant's consent. Id. To preserve the defendant's right to a potentially favorable judgment, the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of considering possible alternatives before declaring a mistrial. Id.
60 367 U.S. at 369. The Jorn Court rejected this "benefit" test as "an exercise in pure
speculation." 400 U.S. at 483; see Comment, supra note 51, at 902 & n.57.
61 400 U.S. at 483; see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 465; Note, supra note 46, at 180.
62 Comment, supra note 51, at 902. A significant reorganization of Court personnel followed
the decision in Jorn, in which Justices Harlan and Black were replaced by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist. Id. at 902 & n.60. At least one commentator, however, has asserted that the confused state of the Court's mistrial decisions cannot be completely explained by noting personnel
changes on the Court, but rather that the decisions "reflect a genuine uncertainty among the
Justices concerning the nature of the competing interests and the appropriate way to reconcile
them." Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 472.
63 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
64 Id. at 459, 463. Writing for a five-man majority, Justice Rehnquist interpreted this phrase
from Perez, as requiring the protection of the public's interest "in seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict." Id. at 463.
65 Id. at 464. In Somerville, the jury was impanelled and sworn before the prosecutor
realized that the indictment was fatally defective. Id. at 459. Under state law the defect could
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rule Downum and Jorn,6 6 its "totally unstructured analysis" has been
criticized as a retreat from the clear articulation of the "manifest
67
necessity" test as developed in these cases.

An exception to the "manifest necessity" test has been applied in
situations where the mistrial was granted at the request of the defendant. 68 The Supreme Court has generally recognized that a defense
motion for mistrial ordinarily removes the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution. 69 It is felt that the reason the defendant's right to remain before a particular tribunal is so valued is because he "has a
significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case

from the jury when circumstances occur which might be thought to
warrant a declaration of mistrial."70 In United States v. Dinitz, 71 the

Court concluded that "[t]he important consideration for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary
control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." 72

not be cured by amendment nor waived by defendant, but could later be asserted by defendant
to defeat any conviction based upon the indictment. Id. at 459-60. The trial court granted the
state's motion for a mistrial, and the defendant was convicted under a corrected second indictment. Id. at 460. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction despite the defendant's double
jeopardy claim. Id. at 460-61. The court stated:
If an error would make reversal [of a conviction] on appeal a certainty, it would not
serve "the ends of public justice" to require that the Government proceed with its
proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped of
that success by an appellate court.
Id. at 464.
66 Id. at 477 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Downum was distinguished as involving an error
"lend[ing] itself to prosecutorial manipulation." Id. at 464. Jorn was distinguished as involving
"erratic" action by the trial judge in a case in which there were "less drastic alternatives"
readily available. Id. at 469-70.
67 Id. at 477 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, one of four dissenters in Somerville,
wrote a separate opinion condemning the obfuscation of the Jorn and Downum rationale. Id.;
see Note, supra note 46, at 183; Comment, supra note 51, at 904-09. The majority opinion has
also been criticized for failing to sufficiently preserve the defendant's "valued right" to have his
trial continue before the initial jury, 410 U.S. at 472-73 (White, J., dissenting), 478 (Marshall,
J., dissenting), and failing to protect him from the underlying harms the double jeopardy clause
aspires to prevent. Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
68 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
467 (1964); Note, supra note 46, at 184 &.n.126.
69 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 485 (1971); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467 (1964).
70 United States v. Jon, 400 U.S. at 485. It is reasoned that by requesting or consenting to
a mistrial, the defendant is, in effect, consenting to the dismissal of the particular tribunal,
taking the case from the jury prior to verdict, and consenting to later proceedings. Note, 42
Mo. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1977).
71 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
72 Id. at 609. In Dinitz, the defendant's motion for a mistrial was granted and the jury
discharged after the judge had expelled the defense attorney from the courtroom for improper
behavior during the trial. id. at 604-05. Prior to his second trial, the defendant moved to
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While the Court recognized that there may be cases in which the
defendant is faced with a "Hobson's choice" between relinquishing
his valued right to proceed before the first jury and continuing a trial
tainted by prejudicial error, it held that he was entitled only to participate in the decision concerning which course to follow. 73 The
Court noted that an exception to the rule could be found in cases
involving "prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,"74 but that mere
error does not invoke that exception. 75 These principles were
explained by the Court one Term later when it held that in the absence of an error arising from a prosecutorial tactic designed to harass
or prejudice the defendant, the successful defense motion for mistrial
76
does not bar reprosecution.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the reasoning
developed in the Somerville line of cases should not be applied outside of the mistrial context. 7 7 The validity of the mistrial analysis is
diluted when attempts are made to apply it to other types of decisions favorable to the defendant, which usually contemplate an end to

dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 605. The motion was denied and the
defendant was subsequently convicted. Id. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit court of appeals
reversed the conviction, holding that "the trial judge's response to the conduct of defense counsel deprived [the defendant's] motion for a mistrial of its necessary consensual character." 492
F.2d 53, 59 n.9 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). The court of appeals determined
that the actions of the trial judge had rendered the defendant unable to continue his defense,
leaving him with "no choice but to move for or accept a mistrial." 492 F.2d at 59. The Supreme
Court reversed and upheld defendant's reprosecution. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
612 (1976).
'3 424 U.S. at 609; see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 535; Note, supra note 46, at 185-86.
74 424 U.S. at 607 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971)). In United
States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit court of appeals interpreted
Jorn and Dinitz as barring reprosecution in cases where prosecutorial overreaching is found,
regardless of the defendant's request for mistrial. Id. at 1255-56. The court of appeals extracted
from Dinitz the standards for finding prosecutorial overreaching as "'gross negligence or intentional misconduct' caus[ing] aggravated circumstances to develop which 'seriously prejudice[d] a
defendant' causing him to 'reasonably conclude that a continuation of the tainted proceeding
would result in a conviction."' Id. at 1256 (footnote omitted).
75 424 U.S. at 608-09. It has been suggested, however, that this exception should be more
sensitive to cases involving prosecutorial or judicial error, where the defendant's decision to
abandon the first trial cannot truly be considered a voluntary choice. See Schulhofer, supra note
26, at 533, 537-38; Note, supra note 46, at 190 & n.178; Note, supra note 51, at 912. The law
does not place the defendant in the "incredible dilemma" of being forced to choose between the
exercise of his right to a fair trial and the preservation of his double jeopardy protections. See
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1957);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. at 135 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Myers,
422 Pa. 180, 189, 220 A.2d 859, 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 963 (1966).
70 Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1978); see Note, supra note 46, at 187.
77 See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365 n.7.
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the prosecution. 7 8 Rejecting the analogy to mistrials in a case involving the dismissal of an indictment after trial, the Jenkins Court noted
that whether the trial proceedings end in a mistrial or in favor of the
79
defendant "is of critical importance" for double jeopardy purposes.
Prior to Jenkins, in determining appealability under the Ball and
Kepner doctrine, 8 reviewing courts had struggled to categorize various types of trial court decisions in terms of whether or not they
constituted "acquittals."81 The Supreme Court adopted a different
approach in Jenkins, developing a standard for determining appealability that did not require the struggle to find an "acquittal" in the
trial proceedings below. 82 Focusing not on the form of the trial court
ruling, but upon the detrimental effects of reprosecution, 8 3 the Court
concluded that "it is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause .

.

. that further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the res-

olution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged,
84
would have been required upon reversal and remand."
"' See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL 'PRACTICE, supra note 29,

110.04[3], at 102.9; Note, supra

note 46, at 188.
'9 Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365 n.7. Two Terms later, this distinction in Jenkins was recognized
as pivotal in focusing upon the proper analysis for that decision. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S.
23, 29-30 (1977); see notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
80 See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 288-90. Before Jenkins introduced the
easily administered "further proceedings" approach, appellate courts struggled with a "process
of searching the record [of the trial court] for an acquittal [which] was time-consuming and
unpredictable." Double Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 309-10. This difficult search led to "disparate and often inconsistent" results. Id. at 310; see United States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d
309, 312 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1971); Note, supra note 26, at 1825 & n.21, 1835;
Comment, supra note 31, at 947-49, 953-54 & n.73; Double Jeopardy, supra at 335-36. By
creating uncertainty in the determination of the appealability of trial court decisions, this
troublesome search for an "acquittal" below failed to draw the lines of appellate jurisdiction with
clarity. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 307-08; 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 29,
110.04[3], at 102.15 & n.48.
82 See 420 U.S. at 369-70. In Jenkins, the indictment against the defendant for draft evasion
was dismissed and he was discharged when the trial judge, after considering the evidence developed at trial, decided that the defendant's conscientious objector claim was a valid defense to
the charge, despite its lateness. 490 F.2d at 870. In refusing government appeal, the court of
appeals concluded that since the trial court's decision was based on evidence adduced at the
trial, which went to the general issue of the case, the decision was in fact an acquittal. Id. at
878.
93 420 U.S. at 370. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, emphasized the underlying double jeopardy principles when it concluded that "t]he trial, which could have resulted in
a judgment of conviction, has long since terminated in respondent's favor. To subject him to any
further such proceedings at this stage would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.
"4Id. The "further proceedings" test of Jenkins stands for the rule that "once jeopardy has
attached, an order terminating the proceedings in favor of the defendant under circumstances
that would require any continued prosecution if the order were reversed is not appealable since
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The "further proceedings" test of Jenkins is consistent with the
Court's decision in United States v. Wilson, 85 which made it clear
that the prohibition against multiple trials is the main concern of the
double jeopardy clause. 86 In Wilson, the trial court had dismissed an
indictment on a postverdict defense motion following a jury verdict of
guilty. 8 7 In reversing the Third Circuit decision barring government
appeal, 88 the Supreme Court held that the defendant is not put twice
in jeopardy if a successful government appeal would merely require a
reinstatement of the guilty verdict already rendered. 8 9 The decision
in Wilson, written by Justice Marshall, was the Court's first major
interpretation of the 1971 statutory amendments setting the constitutional limitations on government appeal at the curbstone of double
jeopardy principles. 90 While Wilson clearly established that a defendant is protected from being subjected to multiple trials for the same
offense, some confusion remained as to exactly what proceedings
prior to the trial court's decision constituted former jeopardy. 9 1 This
problem of the "attachment of jeopardy" was dealt with in Serfass v.
United States, 92 where the Court considered the appealability of a
pretrial order dismissing an indictment based on the trial judge's
examination of defendant's affidavit and records. 9 3 The Court conretrial would put the defendant twice in jeopardy." 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
29,
110.04[3], at 102.9; see Comment, supra note 22, at 539-41.
85 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
86 Id. at 342-46. The Court isolated the "prohibition against multiple trials as the controlling
constitutional principle" in double jeopardy jurisprudence. Id. at 346; see Double Jeopardy,
supra note 30, at 302-03; Comment, supra note 22, at 533-34.
87 420 U.S. at 333. After the jury had found the defendant guilty of embezzling union funds,
motions were filed for arrest of judgment, judgment of acquittal and a new trial. Id. at 334. The
district court dismissed the indictment pursuant to defendant's Marion motion, concluding after
hearing all the evidence that the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial had been substantially prejudiced by preindictment delay. Id. For a discussion of Marion motions, see notes
145-49 infra and accompanying text. Because of the amount of time that had elapsed between
the date of the alleged offense and the indictment, by trial date the two witnesses with the most
substantial knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the prosecution's allegations
were no longer available to the court. 420 U.S. at 334.
88 492 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals, noting that the district court had
based its dismissal of the indictment on facts adduced at trial relating to the general issue of the
case, found the dismissal to be functionally indistinguishable from an acquittal. Id. at 1348.
89 420 U.S. at 344-45.
90 See Double Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 302-06.
91 See Comment, supra note 31, at 955-56. The problem centers around the courts' struggle
"to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies [of
double jeopardy] are implicated." Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). Until this
point when jeopardy attaches, the fifth amendment's guarantee has no application, since it is
fundamental that the defendant "must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy." Id.
at 393.
92 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
93 Id. at 379-80.
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cluded that since the initial proceedings were not tantamount to a
trial, jeopardy had not attached, 94 and the constitutional prohibition
95
against multiple trials had no application.
The policies enunciated in the double jeopardy trilogy of Jenkins,
Wilson and Serfass established a simple test to determine the issue of
appealability. 96 If the order terminating the trial proceedings favorably to defendant was made after the attachment of jeopardy, and government appeal would require further proceedings and supplemental
fact finding, the prohibition against multiple trials barred the appeal. 97 Recognizing the "critical importance," for double jeopardy
purposes, of distinguishing a mistrial ruling from an "order contemplat[ing] an end to all prosecution of the defendant for the offense
charged," the Court in Lee v. United States 98 lent credence to the
Jenkins approach while distinguishing its own case on the facts. 99 The
Lee Court interpreted Jenkins as a bar to reprosecution from any
"midtrial dismissal . .. granted on the ground, correct or not, that
the defendant simply cannot be convicted of the offense charged." 100
94 Id. at 389. The Court noted its own established view "that jeopardy does not attach until
a defendant is 'put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge."'
Id. at 391 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)). In a bench trial, jeopardy
attaches when the judge begins to hear evidence, and in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled
and sworn. 420 U.S. at 388. As Chief Justice Burger explained in writing for the Serfass Court,
these rules are not mere technicalities, nor rigid and mechanical rules, id. at 391, but a judicial
"attempt to impart content to an abstraction." Id. Recently, the Court has held that the rule
regarding the attachment of jeopardy in a.jury trial "is an integral part of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy" made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978).
95 420 U.S. at 388-89.
96 See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC'rICE, supra note 29,
110.04 [3], at 102.10-11; Double
Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 309-10.
97 See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC'rCE, supra note 29,
110.04 [3], at 102.10-11; Double
Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 325; Comment, supra note 23, at 349-50.
98 432 U.S. 23, 29-31 (1977).
99 Id. In Lee, at the close of all the evidence, the trial judge reluctantly granted defendant's.
motion to dismiss the information. Id. at 26-27. Under state law the information was fatally
defective in that it failed to charge the requisite knowledge or intent. Id. Lee was subsequently
reprosecuted under a corrected indictment and convicted. Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction despite Lee's double jeopardy claim, 539 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1976), and the Supreme Court affirmed. 432 U.S. 23 (1977). The Court found the
Jenkins approach to be inapplicable, as the error was easily corrected and the trial judge's
decision did not contemplate that criminal proceedings against the defendant were to be terminated, but merely suspended. Id. at 30-31. It was concluded that the trial court's order "was
functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mistrial," as opposed to a judgment ending
the case "'in the defendant's favor."' Id. at 30-31 & n.9.
10 432 U.S. at 30; see Wurzburg, Double Jeopardy: Dismissal and Government Appeal, 13
GoNz. L. REV. 337, 349-50 (1978). The same analysis was followed that same term in a per
curiam opinion in Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977). In Finch, however, Justice
Rehnquist's dissent foreshadowed his analysis in Scott. Desiring to go beyond "the sort of
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Recognizing that reprosecution would most likely be barred by
application of the double jeopardy standards developed in Jenkins and
Lee, the Court in United States v. Scott 101 overruled Jenkins as
"wrongly decided." 102 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
viewed the Jenkins approach as placing too much emphasis upon the
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first empaneled
jury. 10 3 It was concluded that defendant's valued right to have his
case remain before a particular tribunal should not include cases
where he himself has successfully sought termination of the trial prior
to verdict without a resolution of factual guilt or innocence.'04
The Court emphasized the classic principle of double jeopardy
jurisprudence that an acquittal "terminates the prosecution when a
second trial would be necessitated by a reversal."105 The discussion
of this fundamental principle, however, was followed by a resurrection of the type of difficult search for an acquittal that Jenkins had
found unnecessary. 10 6 Noting that "the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal," the Court determined that a defendant is
acquitted only when the trial judge has determined his factual innocence after considering the elements of the alleged offense.' 0 7 Thus,
a "true acquittal" was distinguished from a "legal judgment" not bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. 10 8
The Court recognized that the type of dismissal granted by the
trial judge in this case, as opposed to the typical mistrial, obviously
'bright line' distinction set forth in Wilson and Jenkins," Justice Rehnquist viewed Martin Linen
and Lee as "read[ing] more in terms of balancing" double jeopardy principles. 433 U.S. at 680
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist suggested that the double jeopardy protections
should not be mechanically extended to the defendant who has not previously been subjected to
the ordeal of a criminal trial prior to a determination of his guilt or innocence. Id. (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
101 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
102 Id. at 86-87. Although only three terms had elapsed since the announcement of the

Jenkins standard, the Scott majority credited the Court's "vastly increased exposure to the various facets of the Double Jeopardy Clause" with providing the inspiration to recognize Jenkins as
"wrongly decided." Id.
103 Id.

at 87.

104 Id.

lo5 Id. at 91; see notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
106 437 U.S. at 97-98; see note 81 supra and accompanying text.
107 437 U.S. at 91, 96-99. The Court defined an "acquittal," at least for double jeopardy
purposes, as "'a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged."' Id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. at 571); accord, Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. at 30 n.8; see Note, supra note 46, at
171; Note, supra note 26, at 1836-37.
108 437 U.S. at 98. The Court noted that a dismissal based upon an infringement of a constitutional right of the defendant cannot operate as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes,
since it does not establish his innocence. Id. at 98
& n.1l.
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contemplated a termination of the proceedings in defendant's
favor.109 Language was drawn from Lee, however, which the Court
viewed as sufficient justification for treating dismissals the same as
mistrials in certain cases. 1 10 Since the dismissal here was not a true
acquittal on the merits, the Scott majority analogized it to a declaration of a mistrial, and proceeded to employ mistrial analysis."' In
this manner, the Court applied the general principle that a defendant's successful request for a mistrial removed any double jeopardy
barrier to reprosecution. 112 The defendant had been afforded his
sole right under the circumstances of a tainted trial when he deliberately elected to take the case from the first empaneled jury. 113 The
Court held that when the defendant exercises his choice to remove
the case from the particular judge or jury, the double jeopardy clause
does not insulate him "from the consequences of his voluntary
choice." 114 The defendant was viewed as suffering no deprivation of
his right to proceed before the first empaneled jury when he has
successfully avoided the submission of the issue of guilt or innocence
to that jury. 115 Under these circumstances, the Court allowed the
government to appeal for the purpose of protecting the public's "right
to 'one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its
laws."' 116
The dissent in Scott recognized that under prior double jeopardy
law, the district court's dismissal with prejudice may fairly have been
termed an "acquittal," so as to bar government appeal. 11 7 Moreover,
as Justice Brennan stated, the Jenkins approach obviated the search
for an acquittal in cases where further proceedings relating to a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence would be required

Id. at 94.
110 Id. The Court read Lee as part of its "growing experience with Government appeals,"
demanding a reevaluation of the rationale underlying Jenkins. Id. at 95.
109

"I Id. at 92, 99-100.

Id. at 98-100. By avoiding submission to the judge or jury of his guilt or innocence, the
defendant is held to have consented to a discontinuance of the initial trial proceedings. Id.; see
notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
113 437 U.S. at 95-96; see notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
112

114 437 U.S. at 99.
's
116

Id. at 98-99.
Id.

at 100 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).

117 437 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Following the approach drawn largely from
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), the dissent would have looked beyond the label of
the trial judge's action to find it to be " 'a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at
trial relating to the general issue of the case."' Id. (quoting United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977)).
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upon remand."l 8 The dissenting Justices opposed allowing appealability in criminal cases to revolve around the pre-Jenkins struggle to
pigeonhole the trial court's decision as an acquittal. 1 19 Rather, they
would have applied the "further proceedings" approach of Jenkins,
strengthened0 in Lee, to bar reprosecution under these cir2
cumstances. 1
Even more disturbing to the dissent was the restrictive nature of
the majority's definition of "acquittal". 121 By limiting true acquittals
to those trial court decisions that actually establish the defendant's
factual innocence, the premise underlying the majority's definition
was viewed as "creat[ing] precisely the evils that the Double
Jeopardy Clause was designed to prevent." 122 Justice Brennan noted
that the clause was not merely intended to preserve rulings of factual
innocence, for it is well settled that even erroneous acquittals preclude reprosecution. 123 Rather, double jeopardy principles are designed to prevent multiple prosecutions. 1 24 Recognizing the heavy
personal strain a second trial imposes upon a defendant, 125 and the
tactical advantages accruing to the prosecution, 126 the dissent would
not have allowed the government more than one opportunity to con-

118 437 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan lamented the passing of the
"crystal clear" Jenkins approach, which simply barred reprosecution of a criminal defendant
after "[any midtrial order contemplating an end to all prosecution." Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 110-12 (Brennan, J.,dissenting); see note 81 supra.
"9
120 437 U.S. at 102-03 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
121 Id. at 110-11 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
122Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The premise advanced by the majority that a defendant who has successfully "avoid[ed] conviction on a 'ground unrelated to factual innocence'
somehow stands on a different constitutional footing" than an acquitted defendant was "simply
untenable" to the dissent. Id. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). This fundamental rule, solidified by the Court's opinion in
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962), was reaffirmed in Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78 (1978), where the Court held that once "a defendant has been
acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying
the acquittal were erroneous." Sanabria, 431 U.S. at 64. "The question is not .. .whether a
defendant is 'to receive absolution for his crime,"' but whether the underlying double jeopardy
policies protect him from having to "run the gantlet twice." Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at
373 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
124 437 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125Id. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957); note 26 supra. The heavy strain, embarrassment and expense of repeated criminal trials
subject the defendant to burdens not unlike criminal punishment itself, even where he is not
incarcerated between trials. See Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 498-500.
126 437 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By having viewed all of the defendant's evidence at the first trial, the government will gain the advantage upon retrial of being able "to
shore up any . ..weak points of its case and obtain all the other advantages at the second trial
that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to forbid." Id.
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vince a court to convict.127 Since the basis for the dismissal granted
by the trial judge was viewed as a "complete defense" to the criminal
charges alleged in the indictment, 12 8 the dissenting justices likened it
to favorable rulings based on certain affirmative defenses that "preclude the imposition of criminal liability on defendants." 129 The
majority's definition of "acquittal" was criticized as being too narrow
to encompass even the most common affirmative defenses, most of
which often require a full factual and evidentiary development at
trial. 130 Lastly, as a practical consideration, the dissent forewarned
of the confusion and urrcertainty likely to cloud future judicial attempts at determining the double jeopardy implications of similar
13 1
judgments.
The substantial disparity evident in the Supreme Court's analysis
in Scott is attributable at least in part to the confusion inherent in
recent double jeopardy jurisprudence. While the 1971 amendment to
the government's statutory right to appeal in criminal cases established the clause itself as the heart of double jeopardy analysis, the
need for judicial guidance remained. l3 2 The midtrial dismissal
Id. at 108-09 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). The dissent viewed the majority's "suggestion that
final judgments not based on innocence" infringe upon the public's right to have one full and
opportunity to convict as "plainly erroneous." Id. What is important is that the government
fair
has had "every opportunity to dissuade the trial court from committing erroneous rulings favorable to the accused" and has failed. Id. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 103 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). Although the dismissal of the indictment with prejudice may be a distastefully severe remedy in that the prosecution is terminated without a
determination of guilt or innocence, "such severe remedies are not unique in the application of
constitutional standards." Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973).
129 437 U.S. at 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Among these legal principles that operate as
affirmative defenses, the dissent cited "entrapment, insanity, right to speedy trial, [and] statute
of limitations," as well as preindictment delay. Id.
130Id. The dissent noted that these legal principles "cannot ordinarily be considered apart
from the factual development at trial." Id. The defense of the statute of limitations is suggested
as an example of the mixed questions of law and fact now excluded from the majority's definition of acquittal. Id. at 115 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although a favorable resolution of
one of these affirmative defenses for the defendant usually does not determine his factual innocence, it was "simply untenable" to the dissent to allow reprosecution in light of its status as a
complete defense. Id. at 113-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Comment, supra note 23, at
343-44.
131 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Because of its apparently simple approach, the 1971 amendment to the Criminal Appeals
Act was greeted by the Court as the beginning of "[t]he end to our problems with this Act."
United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254, 255 n.1 (1971). This optimism, however, was soon
dispelled as it became increasingly apparent to the courts that "the amendment has by no
means solved all [the] problems in this field." United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d at 869 n.1.
Most recently, the Supreme Court noted in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), decided the
same day as Scott, that the "deceptively plain language [of the double jeopardy clause] has
given rise to problems both subtle and complex, problems illustrated by no less than eight cases
argued here this very Term." Id. at 32 (footnote omitted).
127
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granted by the district court in Scott "falls somewhere in between" an
133
unappealable acquittal on the merits and an appealable mistrial.
Under the approach taken in Jenkins and Lee, the granting of this
dismissal should not be analogized to a declaration of a mistrial, for
"it is of critical importance whether the proceedings in the trial court
terminate in a mistrial as they did in the Somerville line of cases, or
in the defendant's favor, as they did here." 134 The fundamental distinction turns on whether the trial court intended a termination or
merely a postponement of the prosecution. 13 5 Where, by a midtrial
dismissal, the trial court determines that the defendant "simply cannot be convicted of the offense charged," 136 the dismissal should
stand as a termination of the criminal proceedings in his favor from
37
which no government appeal may be taken.'
Instead of adhering to this unequivocal double jeopardy standard, the Scott majority engaged in an unnecessary struggle to define
an "acquittal." 138 It is an exaltation of form over substance to labor
needlessly over attaching the label of "acquittal" to the trial court
disposition. 139 The Ball doctrine barring appeals from acquittals is
not conclusive in resolving the double jeopardy implications of other
trial court dismissals.14 0 In amending the Criminal Appeals Act,
Congress intended to bar any appeal, even from a dismissal, when
4
further prosecution would violate the double jeopardy clause.' '
What is relevant to the issue of appealability is the effect of reprosecution upon underlying double jeopardy interests, not the label that
142
may be attached to the dismissal.
In Scott, the government sought reprosecution on a count of the
indictment dismissed by the district court for impermissible prein' Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 6. The government, in fact, conceded that the
dismissal of the indictment by the district court was not "the functional equivalent of a mistrial."
Id. at 6-7, 11-12.
134 United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365 n.7; Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. at 29-30;

Wurzburg, supra note 100, at 360.
135 Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. at 30; Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978);
see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7; Comment, supra note 23, at 316 n.71.

13' Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. at 30; Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977).
07 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.

139 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 66 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
at 392-93.
140 See Comment, supra note 23, at 330; notes 37--41 supra and accompanying text.
141 See note 35 supra.

142 United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 279 n.7; United States v. Velazquez, 490 F.2d 29,
39-42 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion); Comment, supra note 22, at 539; Comment, supra
note 23, at 336; see 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 29,
110.04[3], at 102.13-14
& n.43.
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dictment delay. 1 4 3 After hearing all the evidence at trial, the court
determined that the intentional prosecutorial delay between the
commission of the offense and the initiation of prosecution against the
defendant had prejudiced his ability to defend himself. 144 United
States v. Marion 145 established that when a defendant demonstrates
actual prejudice to his defense as a result of this delay, .the due process clause of the fifth amendment sanctions dismissal of the affected
counts of the indictment.' 46 A recent clarification of the Marion due
process inquiry in United States v. Lovasco 147 requires courts to consider "the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the
accused."148 Consistent with due process analysis, courts must determine whether prosecution of the defendant after the delay in the
initiation of criminal proceedings against him violates "'the community's sense of fair play and decency."' 149
It is arguable that the district court may have erred in applying
the Marion standard, as adopted by the Sixth Circuit, to the cir15 1
cumstances in Scott. 150 The relatively brief length of the delay,
14

United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d at 903.

144 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
145404 U.S. 307 (1971).
I" Id. at 324. Although the sixth amendment guarantees that "[in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial," U.S. CONST. amend. VI, Marion
establishes that the "speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant .. .
becomes an 'accused"' through the initiation of criminal proceedings against him. 404 U.S. at
313. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), which authorizes the dismissal of an indictment
"[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to the grand jury," is also inapplicable
to preaccusation delay. 404 U.S. at 319.
147431 U.S. 783 (1977).
148id. at 790.
149Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
15oThe Sixth Circuit has recognized that a dismissal is authorized by Marion and the due
process clause upon a showing by the defendant of actual prejudice to his defense and that the
government's purpose for the delay was to gain an unfair tactical advantage. United States v.
Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Aired, 513 F.2d 330, 332 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Giacalone, 477 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Stewart, 426 F.Supp. 58, 59 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847,
852 (D. Md. 1976); accord, United States v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1978).
Other circuits have adopted more of a balancing approach, weighing three factors
-the length of the delay, actual prejudice to the def6ndant resulting from the delay and the
government's reason for the delay. United States v. Titus, 576 F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Medina-Arellano, 569 F.2d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pallan,
571 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978); United States v. Shaw, 555
F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1977).
151 The delay of five and one-half months between the dates of the commission of the alleged
offenses and the return of the indictment was described by the government as "not even long
enough to justify judicial inquiry." Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 11 n.8. While it is
clear that "[aictual prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may result from the shortest and
most necessary delay," the length of the delay in Scott by itself does not seem so unreasonable
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the tenuous nature of the claimed resultant prejudice, 152 and the justifications advanced by the government 153 suggest that this was not
the strongest case for a dismissal for oppressive preindictment delay. 15 4 The trial judge's decision in these cases, however, involves a
delicate discretionary judgment, 15 5 one that he is most suited to

and prejudicial as to require the dismissal of the affected counts of the indictment. United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324; see United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
1976).
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has developed a line of Marion cases applying a
stricter judicial standard to delays in cases involving narcotics offenses where the government's
case rests upon the work of undercover agents. United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 39-41
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847, 851-54 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Ross v.
United States, 349 F.2d 210, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1965). As a "'rough rule of thumb,"' these
cases have established that delays of over four months between the undercover agent's detection
of the crime and notice to the accused of criminal charges require a "detailed exploration of
underlying reasons." 524 F.2d at 840-41; 459 F.2d at 851-52. In reconciling "the competing
interests of effective enforcement of the narcotics laws and early notice to the accused-to-be of
the impending accusation," 524 F.2d at 839-40, the District of Columbia Circuit approach requires the government to diligently attempt to notify the accused after this four month period,
unless further delay was necessitated by the desirability of preserving the agent's cover. 459
F.2d at 851-52; see United States v. Williams, 352 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
152 The district court found actual prejudice based upon the dimming of defendant's memory
of the events surrounding the offenses charged. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 4. It
has been cautioned, however, that "i]f the limitation period for prosecution were measured by
the length of the defendant's memory of routine events, few crimes could be prosecuted."
United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1976); see United States v. Jones, 524
F.2d 834, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But when the defendant can convince the trial judge of his
inability to recollect the events surrounding the alleged offenses as a result of preindictment
delay, he is entitled to have that factor weighed toward a finding of actual prejudice. United
States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 680 (9th Cir. 1977).
153 The government noted that there were several justifications for the delay in seeking the
indictment, "including the need to protect the identity of an informant, the desirability of pursuing additional leads in the investigation to discover respondent's confederates and source of
supply, and the fact that no grand jury was sitting for two months." Brief for United States,
supra note 1, at 11 n.8. If the reasons for the delay were legitimately in furtherance of preserving an ongoing investigation or protecting the identity of the government informant, due process does not require the dismissal of the indictment. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at
791-92; United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1978): United States v. Cowsen;
530 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1976); Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trials: Rights and Remedies,
27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1975). Where, however, the prejudicial delay was a prosecutorial tactic to gain an advantage over the accused, the indictment should be dismissed for the
due process violation. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324; United States v. Revada, 574
F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1978).
1s4 In Lovasco, Justice Marshall warned of the many harmful consequences of pressuring
prosecutors into filing criminal charges prematurely to avoid the threat of dismissal for preindictment delay. 431 U.S. at 792-95. Prosecutors would be unable to complete ongoing investigations, defendants would be faced with charges that might not have been pursued after a
complete investigation, and courts would be forced to spend valuable public resources on prosecutions not in the public interest. Id.
155Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324-25.
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make. Moreover, even if the dismissal was erroneous, the burden of
judicial error should not fall upon the defendant. 1 56 Whether the
dismissal was correct or not, the effects of reprosecution are the same
for the defendant. 157 The dismissal, coming at the close of all the
evidence at trial, obviously did not contemplate reprosecution, 158 but
rather was a determination by the court "that the defendant simply
cannot be convicted of the offense charged." 159 The trial judge's decision to grant the dismissal at that stage of the proceedings was a
judgment that the defendant should not be exposed to the risk of
conviction on the affected counts. 160

156 In a vigorous dissent in Gori, in which three other justices joined, Justice Douglas concluded that the "risk of judicial arbitrariness" should properly rest on the government rather
than on the defendant. 367 U.S. at 373 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The burden of this risk is
properly placed on the government, for double jeopardy principles were "designed to help
equalize the position of government and the individual," id. at 372, "redressing at least part of
the potential imbalance of resources." Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 505.
157 As noted by Justice Brennan in the dissenting opinion, "however egregious the error of
the acquittal, the termination favorable to the accused has been regarded as no different from a
factfinder's acquittal that resulted from errors of the trial judge." 437 U.S. at 107 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
158 In granting the midtrial dismissal, "the District Judge concluded that the facts adduced at
trial established that unjustifiable and prejudicial preindictment delay gave respondent a complete defense to the charges contained in count one." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 103
(Brennan, J., dissenting). It is obvious that the actual prejudice found to have been suffered by
the defense in this case-the dimming of memories-cannot be cured by the issuance of a
second indictment. See United States v. Clay, 481 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973).
159 Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. at 30; Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977).
160 See 437 U.S. at 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The government argued that the legal
grounds for motions to dismiss that cannot be resolved prior to trial should not be ruled upon
until after verdict. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 8, 24-25. If the defendant is acquitted, there would be no need to rule upon the legal claim. If convicted, the defendant's legal
objections could be determined in his favor and the verdict set aside. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 34.
In this manner, the government's right of appeal would be preserved, since a successful challenge would merely require a reinstatement of the verdict, rather than a second prosecution.
See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345, 352--53; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. at 672.
This approach in essence has been supported by legal commentators. See Double Jeopardy,
supra note 30, at 315-17; Comment, supra note 23, at 347-48. The problem with this approach
is evident in cases where judicial or prosecutorial error or misconduct so seriously prejudices a
defendant's case that conviction seems inevitable. Requiring a defendant to continue in these
tainted proceedings toward an unjust conviction, followed by his motion to set aside the verdict,
and, if successful, governmental appeal to reinstate it, spawns substantially the same "anxiety,
expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions." United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at
608; see United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1964). Authority must remain with the

trial judge to terminate the proceedings favorably to the defendant as soon as he becomes
convinced that there has been a violation of due process. See United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d
670, 680 (9th Cir. 1977). Moreover, the effect of actual prejudice to the defense is most accurately assessed "in the context of the evidence adduced at trial," and the trial judge may prefer
to "reserve judgment on defendant's motion until the close of all evidence in the trial." United
States v. Wilford, 364 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D. Del. 1973).
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Furthermore, the dismissal was granted well after jeopardy had
attached, and after all of the defendant's evidence had been revealed.
To allow reprosecution after the government has viewed the defendant's evidence would unfairly strengthen the already powerful prosecutorial arsenal. Having gained penetrating insight into defense tactics and substantive defenses, the government could strengthen its
case upon retrial. 16 1 The prosecution, which failed to convince the
trial court to convict in the first instance, would be given a second
chance, thus enhancing the possibility of the unjust conviction of the
innocent. 16 2 The resulting personal strain, anxiety and expense to
the defendant is the very evil which the constitutional prohibition
163
seeks to prevent.
Through its decision in Sisson, the Supreme Court called upon
Congress to clearly delineate the scope of appellate jurisdiction in
criminal cases. 164 Weary of the uncertainty and confusion inherent
in pigeonholing trial court dispositions into limited statutory
categories, the Court sought "a clear, easily administered test." 165
Congress responded by making the double jeopardy clause itself the
only barrier to the government's right of appeal. 166 Courts were presented with the task of determining the appealability of particular
judgments by considering the effect of reprosecution upon underlying
double jeopardy interests. Taken together, the 1975 trilogy of Wilson,
Jenkins and Serfass represented a substantial step by the Supreme
Court toward simplifying an issue that had been continually beset by
confusion. 1 6 7 By fashioning a clear and practical approach to the
issue of government appeal, the Court had met the challenge posed
by the 1971 statutory amendment. 16 8 The clarity of this approach,
however, has been abrogated by the Court's decision in Scott. By
making appealability, for double jeopardy purposes, depend upon
whether the trial judge's decision can fairly be labeled an "acquittal,"
Scott returns double jeopardy jurisprudence to the imbroglio com-

161 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352; see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 506 & n.239,
508-09; Double Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 332 n.196; Comment, supra note 23, at 341-42.
162 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); Note supra note 26, at 1837-

39, 1841; Comment, supra note 23, at 340-41.
163 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see Schulhofer, supra note 26, at
498.
164 United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 307-08.
165 Id. at 307.

166 See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
167 See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
168 See Double Jeopardy, supra note 30, at 350; Comment, supra note 22, at 541.
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plained of in Sisson. 169 Moreover, by restricting unappealable judgments to determinations of factual innocence, the Scott analysis fails
to adequately appraise the full complement of interests protected by
the double jeopardy clause.
John K. Bennett

169 See note 81 supra and accompanying text; see Wurzburg, supra note 100, at 362.

